The Complexity of Fairness through Equilibrium by Othman, Abraham et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
31
2.
62
49
v3
  [
cs
.G
T]
  3
0 S
ep
 20
14
The Complexity of Fairness through Equilibrium
Abraham Othman
aothman@cs.cmu.edu
Christos Papadimitriou
EECS
UC Berkeley
christos@cs.berkeley.edu
Aviad Rubinstein
EECS
UC Berkeley
aviad@eecs.berkeley.edu
June 21, 2018
Abstract
Competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) is a well-
known fair allocation mechanism [Foley, 1967, Varian, 1974,
Thomson and Varian, 1985]; however, for indivisible resources a
CEEI may not exist. It was shown in Budish [2011] that in the case of
indivisible resources there is always an allocation, called A-CEEI, that is
approximately fair, approximately truthful, and approximately efficient,
for some favorable approximation parameters. This approximation is
used in practice to assign business school students to classes. In this
paper we show that finding the A-CEEI allocation guaranteed to exist
by Budish’s theorem is PPAD-complete. We further show that finding an
approximate equilibrium with better approximation guarantees is even
harder: NP-complete.
1 Introduction
University classes have limited capacity, and some are more popular than others.
This creates an interesting allocation problem. Imagine that each student has
ordered all possible bundles of courses from most desirable to least desirable, and
the capacities of classes are known. What is the best way to allocate class seats
to students? There are several desiderata for a course allocation mechanism:
Fairness In what sense is the mechanism “fair”?
Efficiency Are all possible seats in courses allocated?
Feasibility Are any classes oversubscribed?
Truthfulness Are students motivated to honestly report their preferences to
the mechanism?
Computational efficiency Can the allocation be computed from the data in
polynomial time?
Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (CEEI) [Foley, 1967, Varian,
1974, Thomson and Varian, 1985] is a venerable mechanism with many attrac-
tive properties: In CEEI all agents are allocated the same amount of “funny
money”, next they declare their preferences, and then a price equilibrium is
found that clears the market. The market clearing guarantees efficiency and
feasibility. The mechanism has a strong, albeit technical, ex post fairness guar-
antee that emerges from the notion that agents who miss out on a valuable,
competitive item will have extra funny money to spend on other items at equi-
librium. Truthfulness is problematic — as usual with market mechanisms —
even though the problem is mitigated by the large number of agents. However,
CEEI works when the resources to be allocated are divisible and the utilities
relatively benign. It is easy to construct examples in which a CEEI does not
exist when preferences are complex or the resources being allocated are not di-
visible. Indeed, both issues arise in practice in a variety of allocation problems,
including shifts to workers, landing slots to airplanes, and our favorite, courses
to students. [Varian, 1974, Budish, 2011].
It was recently shown in Budish [2011] that an approximation to a CEEI so-
lution, called A-CEEI, exists even when the resources are indivisible and agent
preferences are arbitrarily complex, as required by the course allocation prob-
lems one sees in practice. The approximate solution guaranteed to exist is
approximately fair (in that the agents are given almost the same budget), and
approximately efficient and feasible (in that all classes are filled close to capac-
ity, with the possible exception of very unpopular classes). This result seems to
be wonderful news for the class allocation problem. However, there is a catch:
Budish’s proof is non-constructive as it relies on Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem.
A heuristic algorithm for solving A-CEEI was introduced in Othman et al.
[2010]. The algorithm is a modified search analogue to the traditional
taˆtonnement process, where the prices of courses that are oversubscribed are
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increased, and the prices of courses that are undersubscribed are decreased.
This heuristic algorithm is currently used by the Wharton School (University of
Pennsylvania) to assign their MBA students to courses. It has been documented
that the heuristic algorithm often produces much tighter approximations than
the theoretical bound; yet, on some instances it fails to find even the guaranteed
approximation [Budish, 2011, Section 9].
Thus A-CEEI is a problem where practical interest motivates theoretical
inquiry. We have a theorem that guarantees the existence of an approximate
equilibrium — the issue is finding it. Can the heuristic of Othman et al. [2010]
be replaced by a fast and rigorous algorithm for finding an approximate CEEI?
Or are there complexity obstacles to approximating CEEI?
In this paper, we show that finding the guaranteed approximation to CEEI
is an intractable problem:
Theorem 2, informal statement. The problem of finding an A-CEEI as
guaranteed by Budish [2011] is PPAD-complete.
We also show an essentially optimal NP-hardness result for determining
whether a better approximation exists.
Theorem 3, informal statement. It is NP-hard to distinguish between an
instance where an exact CEEI exists, and one in which there is no A-CEEI
tighter than guaranteed in Budish [2011].
2 The Course Allocation Problem
Even though the A-CEEI and the existence theorem in [Budish, 2011] are ap-
plicable to a broad range of allocation problems, we shall describe our results
in the language of the course allocation problem.
We are given a set of M courses with integer capacities (the supply) (qj)
M
j=1,
and a set of N students, where each student i has a set Ψi ⊆ 2M of permissible
course bundles, with each bundle containing at most k ≤M courses. The set Ψi
encodes both scheduling constraints (e.g., courses that meet at the same time)
and any constraints specific to student i (e.g. prerequisites).
Each student i has a strict ordering over her permissible schedules, denoted
by 4i. We allow arbitrarily complex preferences — in particular, students may
regard courses as substitutes or complements. More formally:
Definition 1. Course Allocation Problem The input to a course allocation
problem consists of:
• For each student i a set of course bundles (Ψi)Ni=1.
• The students’ reported preferences, (4i)Ni=1,
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• The course capacities, (qj)Mj=1, and
The output to a course allocation problem consists of:
• Prices for each course (p∗j )Mj=1,
• Allocations for each student(x∗i )Ni=1, and
• Budgets for each student (b∗i )Ni=1.
How is an allocation evaluated? The clearing error of a solution to the allo-
cation problem, is the L2 norm of the length-M vector of seats oversubscribed
in any course, or undersubscribed seats in courses with positive price.
Definition 2. The clearing error α of an allocation is
α ≡
√∑
j
z2j
Where zj is given by
zj =
{ ∑
i x
∗
ij − qj if p∗j > 0;
max
[(∑
i x
∗
ij − qj
)
, 0
]
if p∗j = 0.
We can now define the notion of approximate CEEI. The quality of approx-
imation is characterized by two parameters: α, the clearing error (how far is
our solution from a true competitive equilibrium?) and β, the bound on the
difference in budgets (how far from equal are the budgets?). Informally, α can
be thought of as the approximation loss on efficiency, and β can be thought of
as the approximation loss on fairness.
Definition 3. An allocation is a (α, β)-CEEI if:
1. Each student is allocated their most preferred affordable bundle. Formally
∀i : x∗i = argmax
4i

xi ∈ Ψi :∑
j
xijp
∗
j ≤ b∗i


2. Total clearing error is at most α.
3. Every budget b∗i ∈ [1, 1 + β].
In Budish [2011] it is proved that an (α, β)-approximate CEEI always exists,
for some quite favorable (and as we shall see, essentially optimal) values of α
and β:
Theorem 1. Budish [2011] For any input preferences, there exists a (α, β)-
CEEI with α =
√
kM/2 and any β > 0.
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Recall that k is the maximum bundle size. α =
√
kM/2 means that, for large
number of students and course capacities, the market-clearing error converges
to zero quite fast as a fraction of the endowment. It is also shown in Budish
[2011] that the mechanism which allocates courses according to such an A-CEEI
satisfies attractive criteria of approximate fairness, approximate truthfulness,
and approximate Pareto efficiency. The reader may consult Budish [2011] for
the precise definitions of the economic properties of the A-CEEI mechanism.
Total Functions and PPAD
Theorem 1 is an example of a non-constructive existential result; such theo-
rems are common in mathematics, and are quite often related to economics
(recall Nash’s theorem, Arrow-Debreu theorem, etc.). It is often important
to determine whether there is a polynomial algorithm for finding the solution
guaranteed by such a theorem; computational problems of this nature are called
total, because they correspond to total functions from inputs to solutions.
In exploring the difficulty of total problems, applying the methodology
of NP-completeness is problematic. The intuitive reason is that, for ex-
ample, a reduction from 3SAT relies heavily on the fact that the starting
3SAT instance may be unsatisfiable. Therefore 3SAT cannot be reduced in
any meaningful way to a total problem such as A-CEEI (see Chapter 2 of
Nisan et al. [2007] for a discussion of this point). NP-completeness does not
seem to be an option. But there is an alternative: Total problems can of-
ten be proved complete for certain complexity classes between P and NP. For
example, during the past decade several game-theoretic problems have been
proved complete for the complexity class PPAD, containing difficult problems
related to fixed point theorems such as Brouwer’s, Nash’s, competitive equi-
libria, and so on (Papadimitriou [1994], Abbott et al. [2005], Codenotti et al.
[2006], Huang and Teng [2007], Chen et al. [2009], Chen and hua Teng [2009],
Daskalakis et al. [2009], Kintali et al. [2009], Palvolgyi [2009], Chen and Teng
[2011], Vazirani and Yannakakis [2011], Chen et al. [2013]).
There are several interesting and subtle ways of defining PPAD, but for our
purposes it is most convenient to define it as the class of all total problems that
are reducible to the problemGcircuit, the problem of finding the fixed point of
a continuous function specified by a “generalized circuit”. Gcircuit is defined
in the next section.
3 A-CEEI is PPAD-Complete
Theorem 2. Computing a
(√
kM
2 , β
)
-CEEI is PPAD-complete, for some poly-
nomially small β > 0.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of this theorem.
4
Membership in PPAD
We first establish that the problem belongs to the class PPAD; this proof is
much harder than usual (see Appendix A). We follow the steps of the existence
proof in Budish [2011], and show that each one can be carried out either in
polynomial time, or through a fixed point. One difficulty is that certain steps
of Budish’s proof are randomized, and we must be derandomized in polynomial
time.
The problem Gcircuit
The reduction is from the PPAD-complete problem Gcircuit, alluded to in the
previous section.
Generalized circuits are similar to the standard algebraic circuits, the main
difference being that generalized circuits contain cycles, which allow them to
verify fixed points of continuous functions. Formally,
Definition 4 (Generalized circuits, Chen et al. [2009]). A generalized cir-
cuit S is a pair (V, T ), where V is a set of nodes and T is a collection of
gates. Every gate T ∈ T is a 5-tuple T = (G, v1, v2, v), in which G ∈
{G/2, G 1
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, G+, G−, G<, G∧, G∨, G¬}1 is the type of the gate; v1, v2 ∈ V ∪ {nil}
are the first and second input nodes of the gate; v ∈ V is the output node.
The collection T of gates must satisfy the following important property: For
every two gates T = (G, v1, v2, v) and T
′ = (G′, v′1, v
′
2, v
′) in T , v 6= v′.
Given a generalized circuit, we are interested in the computational problem
of finding an assignment that simultaneously satisfies all the constraints defined
by the gates.
Definition 5. Given a generalized circuit S = (V , T ), we say that an assignment
x: V → R ǫ-approximately satisfies S if:
∀v ∈ V 0 ≤ x[v] ≤ 1 + ǫ;
and for each gate T = (G, v1, v2, v) ∈ T we have that |x[v]−fG(x[v1], x[v2])| < ǫ,
where fG is defined as follows, depending on the type of gate G:
1. HALF: fG/2 (x) = x/2
2. VALUE: fG 1
2
≡ 12
3. SUM: fG+ (x, y) = min (x+ y, 1)
4. DIFF: fG− (x, y) = max (x− y, 0)
1Chen et al. [2009] define slightly different gates, whose ǫ-approximation can be simulated
by O(log 1/ǫ) of our gates: Gζ can be simulated using G 1
2
and G+; and G×ζ and G= can be
simulated using G/2 and G+.
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5. LESS: fG< (x, y) =
{
1 x > y + β
0 y > x+ β
6. AND: fG∧ (x, y) =
{
1
(
x > 12 + β
) ∧ (y > 12 + β)
0
(
x < 12 − β
) ∨ (y < 12 − β)
7. OR: fG∨ (x, y) =
{
1
(
x > 12 + β
) ∨ (y > 12 + β)
0
(
x < 12 − β
) ∧ (y < 12 − β)
8. NOT: fG¬ (x) = 1− x
Given a generalized circuit S = (V , T ), ǫ-Gcircuit is the problem of finding
an assignment that ǫ-approximately satisfies it. It is shown in Chen et al. [2009]
to be PPAD-complete for ǫ = 1
poly(|V |) .
Overview of the Reduction
We shall reduce the ǫ-Gcircuit problem to that of finding an (α, β)-CEEI,
with approximation parameters α = Θ(N/M) and ǫ = β/2. (Note that, by
increasing N , we can make α arbitrarily large as a function of M ; in particular,
α >
√
kM/2.)
We will construct gadgets (that is, small sets of courses, students, capacities
and preferences) for the various types of gates in the generalized circuit. Each
gadget that we construct has one or more dedicated “input course(s)”, a single
“output course”, and possibly some “interior courses”. An output course of one
gadget can (and will) be an input to another. The construction will guarantee
that in any A-CEEI the price of the output course will be approximately equal
to the gate applied to the prices of the input courses.
Gate gadgets
To illustrate what needs to be done, we proceed to construct a gate for the
function fG¬ (x) = 1− x; in particular, this implements a logic NOT.
Lemma 1. (NOT gadget)
Let nx > 4α and suppose that the economy contains the following courses:
• cx (the “input course”) ;
• c1−x with capacity q1−x = nx/2 (the “output course”);
and the following set of students:
• nx students interested only in the schedule {cx, c1−x};
and suppose further that at most n1−x = nx/4 other students are interested
in course c1−x.
Then in any (α, β)-CEEI
p∗1−x ∈ [1− p∗x, 1− p∗x + β]
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Proof. Observe that:
• If p∗1−x > 1 − p∗x + β, then none of the nx students will be able to afford
the bundle {cx, c1−x}, and therefore there will be at most n1−x = nx/4
students enrolled in the c1−x - much less than the capacity nx/2. Therefore
z1−x ≥ nx/4.
• On the other hand, if p∗1−x < 1 − p∗x, then all nx students can afford the
bundle {cx, c1−x} - therefore the class will be overbooked by nx/2; thus,
z1−x ≥ nx/2.
Therefore if p∗1−x /∈ [1− p∗x, 1− p∗x + β], then ‖z‖2 ≥ nx/4 > α - a contradiction
to (α, β)-CEEI.
Similarly, we construct gadgets that simulate all the gates of the generalized
circuit:
Lemma 2. Let nx ≥ 28 · α and suppose that the economy has courses cx and
cy. Then for any of the gate functions fG in the definition of ǫ-Gcircuit, we
can add: a course cz, and at most nx students interested in each of cx and cy,
such that in any (α, β)-CEEI p∗z ∈
[
f
(
p∗x, p
∗
y
)− 2β, fG (p∗x, p∗y)+ 2β].
In particular, p∗z continue to satisfy the above inequalities in every (α, β)-
CEEI even if up to nz ≤ nx/28 additional students (beyond the ones needed in
the proof) are interested in course cz.
We defer the proof of Lemma 2 to the appendix.
Course-size amplification
So far, we have constructed gadgets that compute all the gates necessary for
the circuit in the reduction from ǫ-Gcircuit. What happens when we try to
concatenate them to form a circuit? Recall the last sentence in the statement
of Lemma 2: It says that the prices continue to behave like the gate that is
simulated, as long as there are not too many additional students that try to
take the output course. (If there are more students, they may raise the price
of the course beyond what we expect.) In particular, the number of additional
students that may want the output course is smaller than the number of students
that want the input course.
If we concatenated the gadgets without change, we would need to have larger
class sizes as we increase the depth of the simulated circuit. This increase in
class size is exponential in the depth of the circuit. Things get even worse- since
we reduce from generalized circuits, our gates form cycles. If the class size must
increase at every gate it would have to be infinite!
To overcome this problem we construct a COPY gadget that preserves the
price from the input course, but is robust to twice as many additional students:
Lemma 3. (Course-size amplification gadget)
Let nx ≥ 100α and suppose that the economy contains the following courses:
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• cx (the “input course”)
• for i = 1, . . . 10, ci with capacities qi = 0.5 · nx (“interior courses”);
• cx′ with capacity qx′ , s.t. qx ≤ qx′ ≤ 4nx (“output course”);
and the following sets of students:
• nx students interested in schedules ({cx, ci})10i=1 (in this order);
• ni = 0.49 · nx students (∀i) interested in schedules
({cx′ , ci} , {ci} , {ci+1} , . . . , {c10}) (in this order);
and suppose further that at most nx′ = 2nx other students are interested in
course cx′ .
Then in any (α, β)-CEEI
p∗x′ ∈ [p∗x − β, p∗x + β]
In particular, notice that the price of cx′ is guaranteed to approximate the
price of cx, even in the presence of additional nx′ = 2nx students - twice as
many students as we added to cx.
Proof. We start by proving that all the ci’s simulate NOT gadgets simultane-
ously, i.e. for every i and every (α, β)-CEEI, p∗i ∈ [1− p∗x, 1− p∗x + β].
• If p∗i > 1 − p∗x + β, assume wlog that it is the first such i, i.e. p∗j ≤
1− p∗x + β < p∗i for every j < i.
None of the nx students can afford buying both cx and ci. Furthermore,
for every j < i, none of the nj students will prefer ci over cj . Therefore
at most ni students will take this course: z
∗
i ≥ 0.01nx.
• If, on the other hand, p∗i < 1 − p∗x, then all nx students will buy course
ci or some previous course cj (for j ≤ i); additionally for every j ≤ i,
each of the nj corresponding students will buy some course ck for j ≤
k ≤ i. Therefore the total overbooking of classes 1, . . . , i will be at least∑
j≤i z
∗
j ≥ nx · (1− 0.01i) - a contradiction to (α, β)-CEEI.
Now that we established that p∗i ∈ [1− p∗x, 1− p∗x + β], we shall prove the main
claim, i.e. that p∗x′ ∈ [p∗x − β, p∗x + β].
• If p∗x′ > p∗x + β, then none of the ni students, for any ni, can afford
buying both cx′ and ci. Therefore, even in the presence of additional
nx′ = 2nx students who want to take cx′ , the class will be undersubscribed
by z∗x′ ≥ qx′ − nx′ = 2nx
• If p∗x′ < x+ β, then all ni students, for each i, can afford to buy their top
schedule - both {ci, cx′}. Therefore cx′ will be oversubscribed by at least
z∗x′ ≥ 0.9 · nx - a contradiction to (α, β)-CEEI.
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Finally, given an instance of ǫ-Gcircuit, we can use the gadgets we con-
structed in Lemmata 1-3 to construct an instance of (α, β)-CEEI that simulates
the generalized circuit.
4 NP hardness
Budish [2011] shows that his existence theorem is tight, that is, there exist
economies in which it is impossible to achieve less than Ω
(√
kM
)
market clear-
ing error. One may hope that on instances encountered in practice, a better
approximation may be possible, and finding it may not be prohibitively hard.
We next show that even in economies that admit an exact CEEI, it is NP-hard
to find even a constant factor improvement over the Ω
(√
kM
)
bound.
Theorem 3. It is NP-hard to distinguish between an economy that has an exact
CEEI, and an economy that does not have a
(
Ω
(√
N +M
)
, β
)
-CEEI for any
0 ≤ β < 1.
In particular, since our reduction uses a constant k, it means that it is NP-
complete to find an
(
Ω
(√
kM
)
, β
)
-CEEI — an approximation factor smaller
only by a multiplicative constant than the approximation guaranteed by the
existence theorem of Budish [2011].
Comparison to Theorem 2
Theorem 2 is in some sense stronger than Theorem 3 in that it applies to a
larger market clearing error. In turn, Theorem 3 is stronger in two ways: (1)
it gives NP-hardness, as opposed to PPAD-hardness; and (2) it applies to any
0 ≤ β < 1, as opposed to a polynomially small β.
4.1 Proof
We reduce from 3SAT-5, i.e., a SAT instance in which every clause contains
exactly 3 variables, and each variable appears in exactly 5 clauses. Feige [1998]
proved that it is NP-hard to distinguish between a satisfiable 3SAT-5 instance,
and a 3SAT-5 instance where at most 1− ǫ can be satisfied, for some ǫ > 02.
Given a 3SAT-5 formula, we construct a gadget for each variable and each
clause. The gadgets are constructed so that for any assignment that completely
satisfies the formula there exists an exact CEEI in the economy.
Furthermore, given an approximate CEEI for the economy which exactly
clears the courses in a subset of the gadgets, one can recover an assignment
2In fact, an equivalent result for 3SAT-B for any constant B would suffice for our tech-
niques. Hardness of approximation with perfect completeness for 3SAT-B was proven by
Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [1991], Arora and Safra [1998], Arora et al. [1998].
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for the 3SAT-5 formula that satisfies all the clauses corresponding to the same
subset. Informally, this means that for every clause that we are unable to satisfy
in the 3SAT-5 formula, there must be a deviation from exact market clearing in
the gadget corresponding to either that clause, or one of its variables.
Because we use a sparse 3SAT, each deviation from market clearing can
affect at most 5 clauses. Each variable gadget uses 13 courses, and each clause
gadget uses only 1 more. For an instance with n clauses and 35n variables, we
have exactly M = 445 n courses. Finally, if ǫn of the clauses are unsatisfied, then
the market clearing error must be at least
√
1
5 · ǫn =
√
ǫ
44 ·M . Since N < M
and ǫ > 0 is a constant, we get NP-hardness with α = Ω
(√
M +N
)
.
Variable gadget
For each variable xi, we have a variable gadget that forces a consistent assign-
ment to xi. The gadget contains 5 pairs of “output courses” O
j
T , O
j
F ; each of
these pairs is also part of the “input courses” of a clause gadget. Additionally,
the gadget has three inner courses: DL, DC , DR. The gadget also has two stu-
dents: sT has preference list: {DL, DC},
{
DL, O
1
T , . . . O
5
T
}
, {DR}; and sF has
preference list: {DR, DC},
{
DR, O
1
F , . . . , O
5
F
}
, {DL}.
• Soundness: It is easy to see that, in any CEEI, xi cannot be assigned
more than one value: otherwise neither student will be assigned DC ; yet if
DC has price zero, then both students would prefer the respective bundles
that contain it.
If, on the other hand, neither OjT nor O
j
F is assigned, we must again have
a nonzero market clearing error for the courses in this gadget:
– If all the inner courses have price zero, then DC will be over de-
manded;
– If DL and DR have price zero, then under any assignment either one
of the three will be over demanded, or DC will be under demanded;
– If p (DC) = 0, p (DL) > 0, and, wlog, p (DL) ≥ p (DR), then either
DC will be over demanded, or DL will be under demanded;
– Finally, since β < 1, if DC has nonzero price, then either it is under
demanded, or one of the three inner courses must be over demanded.
• Completeness: For an assignment with xi = True, let the prices of
OjT , O
j
F , DL, DC , DR be
1
6 , 0,
1
6 , 1, 0, respectively. Under these prices, stu-
dent sT will prefer bundle
{
DL, O
1
T , . . . O
4
T
}
3, while student SF will choose
bundle {DR, DC}.
3Recall that in the completeness we show the existence of exact CEEI, so all the budgets
are exactly 1.
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Figure 1: Example gadgets
(a) Variable gadget, student sT
DL DC DR
X1T X
1
F
The courses (dots) and bundles (ellipses) that interest student sT of the variable gadget. In
particular, note that sT may take the courses corresponding to the assignment X = True.
(b) Variable gadget, student sF
DL DC DR
X1T X
1
F
The courses (dots) and bundles (ellipses) that interest student sF of the variable gadget. In
particular, note that sT may take the courses corresponding to the assignment X = False.
(c) Clause gadget
X1T X
1
F
YT YF ZT ZF
D
The courses (dots) and bundle (shape) corresponding to the assignment (X, Y,Z) =
(True,True,True), one of the seven bundles that may be picked by the clause student.
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Figure 2: Putting the gadgets together
DL DC DR
X1T X
1
F
YT YF ZT ZF
D
Some of the courses (dots) and bundles (shapes) of an economy simulating the formula Ψ =
X ∨ ¬Y ∨ Z.
From bottom to top: the bundles that interest student sT (dashed) and sF (dotted) of
the variable gadget for variable X; and the bundle (solid) corresponding to the assignment
(X, Y,Z) = (True,True,True), one of the seven bundles that may be picked by the clause
student.
Clause gadget
For each clause containing variables {X,Y, Z}, consider seven courses: six in-
put courses XT , XF , YT , YF , ZT , ZF (where each pair is the output courses of a
variable gadget), and a single “budget diluting” course D. We also have a single
gadget student, who is interested in any of the seven bundles corresponding to
a satisfying assignment.
For example if the clause is (X ∨ ¬Y ∨ Z), the gadget student would be in-
terested in the bundles: {XF , YF , ZF , D}, {XF , YF , ZT , D}, {XF , YT , ZF , D},
{XF , YT , ZT , D}, {XT , YF , ZF , D}, {XF , YT , ZF , D}, {XT , YT , ZT , D}. In par-
ticular, the student is not interested in the bundle {XT , YF , ZT , D}, which cor-
responds to assigning (X = False, Y = True, Z = False)
• Soundness: Observe that the variable gadgets students are assigned
courses Xa, Yb, and Zc, then in any exact CEEI, the clause gadget student
must be assigned the bundle {X¬a, Y¬b, Z¬c, D}.
• Completeness: Suppose that the variable gadgets students are assigned
courses Xa, Yb, and Zc, each with price at least
1
6 , while courses X¬a,
Y¬b, and Z¬c are all unassigned. Then if we set the price of D to be
1, the only affordable bundle for the clause gadget student is indeed
{X¬a, Y¬b, Z¬c, D}.
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5 Discussion
In this work we classified the computational complexity of finding an approxi-
mate CEEI as a function of the precision parameter α of the approximation, the
market clearing error. We showed that finding (α, β)-CEEI is PPAD-complete
when α is large enough to guarantee existence, while finding a better approxi-
mation to CEEI is NP-complete.
One potential way around these intractability results could be to restrict
the input language of preferences. This has been a fruitful line of research in
combinatorial auctions [Nisan, 2006, Sandholm and Boutilier, 2006]. However,
in contrast to that space, we do not anticipate limiting language complexity in
the course allocation problem to be fruitful either in theory or in practice. Recall
that the student preferences used in the PPAD-hardness proof are already very
simple. Furthermore, in practice there are significant inherent complexities in
students’ preferences: for example, courses meeting at the same time and courses
with multiple sections.
Despite the negative results shown in this paper, a heuristic search algo-
rithm exists that finds practical solutions to A-CEEI. Interestingly, in both
laboratory experiments as well as real course allocation problems, this heuristic
often finds solutions that are an order of magnitude better than the theoretical√
kM
2 guarantee on the clearing error [Othman et al., 2010] — a performance
which we have shown NP-hard to guarantee. Once again we are faced with a
familiar conundrum: What are the characteristics of the instances appearing in
practice that enable this favorable performance? And how can one develop a
rigorous fast algorithm for them?
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A A-CEEI ∈ PPAD
We show that computing a
(√
σM
2 , β
)
-CEEI is in PPAD, for σ = min{2k,M}.
Remark 1. We assume that the student preferences (%i) are given in the form
of an ordered list of all the bundles in Ψi (i.e., all the bundles that student i
prefers over the empty bundle). In particular, we assume that the total number
of permissible bundles is polynomial.
Remark 2. In fact, we prove that the following, slightly more general problem,
is in PPAD: Given any β, ǫ > 0 and initial approximate-budgets vector b ∈
[1, 1 + β]
N
, find a
(√
σM
2 , β
)
-CEEI with budgets b∗ such that |bi − b∗i | < ǫ for
every i.
Our proof will follow the steps of the existence proof by Budish [2011]. We
will use the power of PPAD to solve the Kakutani problem, and derandomize
the other nonconstructive ingredients.
A.1 Preliminaries
Our algorithm receives as input an economy
(
(qj)
M
j=1 , (Ψi)
N
i=1 , (%i)
N
i=1
)
, pa-
rameters β, ǫ > 0, and an initial approximate-budgets vector b ∈ [1, 1 + β]N .
We denote β¯ = min{β, ǫ}/2.
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We will consider M -dimensional price vectors in P = [0, 1 + β + ǫ]M . In
order to define a price adjustment function, we consider an enlargement P˜ =
[−∞,∈+ β + ǫ]M, as well as a truncation function t : P˜ → P .
For each student i, we denote her demand at prices p˜ with budget bi by
di (p˜, bi) = max(%i) {x′ ∈ Ψi : p˜ · x′ ≤ bi}
Given the total demand of all the students, we can define the excess demand to
be:
z (p˜,b) =
N∑
i=1
di (p˜, bi)− q
A key ingredient to the analysis is the budget-constraint hyperplanes. These
are the hyperplanes in price space along which a student can exactly afford a
specific bundle. For each student i and bundle x, the corresponding budget-
constraint hyperplane is defined as H (i, x) =
{
p˜ ∈ P : p˜ · § = ⌊〉
}
.
A.2 Deterministically finding a “general position” pertur-
bation (step 1)
It is convenient to assume that the budget-constraint hyperplanes are in “gen-
eral position”, i.e. there is no point p˜ ∈ P at which any subset of linearly
dependent budget-constraint hyperplanes intersect (in particular, no more than
M hyperplanes intersect at any point). In the existence proof, this is achieved
by assigning a small random reverse tax τi,x ∈ (−ǫ, ǫ), for each student i and
bundle x; i’s modified cost for bundle x at prices p˜ becomes p˜ · x− τi,x. Given
taxes τ = (τi,x)i∈S,x∈Ψi , we redefine di (p˜, bi, τi), z (p˜,b, τ), and H (i, x, τi,x)
analogously.
In this section, we show how to deterministically choose these taxes.
Lemma 4. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a vector of taxes
τ = (τi,x)i∈S,x∈Ψi such that:
1. −ǫ < τi,x < ǫ (taxes are small)
2. τi,x > τi,x′ if x ≻i x′ (taxes prefer more-preferred bundles)
3. 1 ≤ mini,x {bi + τi,x} ≤ maxi,x {bi + τi,x} ≤ 1 + β (inequality bound is
preserved)
4. bi+ τi,x 6= bi′ + τi′,x′ for (i, x) 6= (i′, x′) (no two perturbed prices are equal)
5. there is no price p˜ ∈ P at which any subset of linearly dependent budget-
constraint hyperplanes intersect4
4The original existence proof of Budish [2011] requires only that no more than M hyper-
planes intersect at any point; this causes problems in the conditional expectation argument
[Budish, 2011, Step 5].
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Proof. Assume wlog that b is rounded to the nearest β¯M−M : otherwise we can
include this rounding in the taxes.
We proceed by induction on the pairs (i, x) of students and bundles: at each
step let τi,x be much smaller than all the taxes introduced so far
5.
More precisely, if (i, x) is the νth pair to be considered, then we set
τi,x ∈ ±β¯M−2νM ,
where the sign is chosen such that condition 3 in the statement of the lemma
is preserved.
Now, assume by contradiction that there exists a k-tuple
H (i1, x1, τi1,x1) , . . . , H (ik, xk, τik,xk) of hyperplanes that intersect at price
vector p˜, and such that the xi’s are linearly dependent. (Note that the latter
holds, in particular, for every (M + 1)-tuple.)
Assume further, wlog, that this is the first such k-tuple, with respect to the
order of the induction. In particular, this means that
{
x1, . . . , xk−1
}
are linearly
independent. Now consider the system(
xT1 . . . x
T
k−1
)
(α) = (xk)
Notice that it has rank k− 1. We can now take k− 1 linearly independent rows
j1, . . . jk−1 such that the following system has the same unique solution α:

x1,j1 . . . xk−1,j1
...
. . .
x1,jk−1 xk−1,jk−1

 (α) =


xk,j1
...
xk,jk−1


Denote
X =


x1,j1 . . . xk−1,j1
...
. . .
x1,jk−1 xk−1,jk−1


Since X is a square matrix of full rank it is invertible, so we have that
α = X−1


xk,j1
...
xk,jk−1


Now, recall that
X−1 =
1
detX


X1,1 . . . Xk−1,1
...
. . .
X1,k−1 Xk−1,k−1


5Assume wlog that for each i we consider the (i, x)’s in order reversed with respect to %i,
so that property 2 is guaranteed.
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whereXi,j is the (i, j)-cofactor ofX . Finally, sinceX is a Boolean matrix, its de-
terminant and all of its cofactors are integers of magnitude less than (k − 1)k−1.
The entries of α are therefore rational fractions with numerators and denomi-
nators of magnitude less than (k − 1)k−1.
Now, by our assumption by contradiction, k hyperplanes intersect at p˜:

x1
...
xk

 (p˜) =


bi1 + τi1,x1
...
bik + τik,xk


Therefore,
bik + τik,xk = xk · p˜ =
k−1∑
l=1
αl (xl · p˜) =
k−1∑
l=1
αl
(
bil + τil,xl
)
(1)
However, if (ik, xk) is the ν
th pair added by the induction, then the following
is an integer:
k−1∑
l=1
(
MMαl
) · M2(ν−1)M
β¯
(
bil + τil,xl
)
but M
(2ν−1)M
β¯
· (bik + τik,xk) is not an integer, a contradiction to Equation (1).
A.3 Finding a fixed point (steps 2-4)
This subsection describes the price adjustment correspondence of Budish [2011],
and is brought here mostly for completeness.
We first define the price adjustment function:
f (p˜) = t (p˜) +
1
2N
z (t (p˜) ;b, τ)
Observe that if p˜∗ is a fixed point p˜∗ = f (p˜∗) of f , then its truncation t (p˜∗) =
p∗ defines an exact competitive equilibrium6. Yet, we know that the economy
may not have an exact equilibrium - and indeed f is discontinuous at the budget
constraint hyperplanes, and so it is not guaranteed to have a fixed point.
Instead, we define an upper hemicontinuous, set-valued “convexification” of
f :
F (p) = co {y : ∃ a sequence pw → p, p 6= pw ∈ P such that f (pw)→ y}
The correspondence F is upper hemicontinuous, non-empty, and convex; there-
fore, by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem it has a fixed point.
Finally, by Papadimitriou [1994] finding this fixed point of F is in PPAD.
6See Appendix A, Step 2 of Budish [2011] for more details.
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Remark 3. Computing the Correspondence:
We round all price vectors to a
(
β¯M
1
2−2(νmax+1)M
)
-grid (this precision suf-
fices to implement the algorithm in lemma 4).
From the proof of Papadimitriou [1994] it follows that it suffices to compute
just a single point in F (p) for every p (this is important because the number
points in F (p) on the grid may be exponential). At any point on the grid, the
price of any bundle is an integer multiple of
(
β¯M
1
2−2(νmax+1)M
)
. In particular,
any budget-constraint hyperplane which does not contain p, must be at distance
at least
(
β¯M
1
2−2(νmax+1)M
)
. Therefore, we can take any point p′ at distance
1
2
(
β¯M
1
2−2(νmax+1)M
)
from p, and which does not lie on any of the hyperplanes
that contain p. Because no budget-constraint hyperplanes lie between p′ and
p, it follows that f (p′) ∈ F (p).
A.4 From a fixed point to approximate CEEI (steps 5-9)
Lemma 5. Given a fixed point p∗ of F , we can find in polynomial time a vector
of prices pφ
′
such that
∥∥∥z(pφ′ ,b, τ)∥∥∥
2
≤
√
σM
2
Proof. We use the method of conditional expectation to derandomize Step 8 of
Budish [2011].
Recall that by remark 3, there exists a neighborhood around p∗ which does
not intersect any budget-constraint hyperplanes (beyond those that contain p∗).
Let 1, . . . , L′ be the indices of students whose budget-constraint hyperplanes
intersect at p∗. For student i ∈ [L′], let wi be the number of corresponding
hyperplanesH
(
i, x1i , τi,x1i
)
, . . .H
(
i, xwii , τi,xwii
)
intersecting at p∗, and assume
wlog that the superindices of x1i , . . . x
wi
i are ordered according to %i.
Let d0i be agent i’s demand when prices are slightly perturbed from p
∗ such
that all xji ’s are affordable. Such a perturbation exists and is easily computable
because the hyperplanes are linearly independent7. Similarly, let d1i denote agent
i’s demand when x2i , . . . x
wi
i are affordable, but x
1
i is not, and so on. Finally,
let zS\[L′] (p∗,b, τ) = dS\[L′] (p∗,b, τ) − q be the market clearing error when
considering the rest of the students. (The demands of S \ [L′] is constant in the
small neighborhood p∗ which does not intersect any additional hyperplanes.)
By Lemma 3 of Budish [2011], there exist distributions afi over d
f
i :
afi ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ [L′] , ∀f ∈ {0} ∪ [wi]
wi∑
f=0
afi = 1 ∀ i ∈ [L′]
7This appears to be a slight inaccuracy in the proof in Budish [2011]
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such that the clearing error of the expected demand is 0:
zS\[L′] (p
∗,b, τ) +
L′∑
i=1
wi∑
f=0
afi d
f
i = 0
We first find such afi in polynomial time using linear programming.
The existence proof then considers, for each i, a random vector Θi =(
Θ1i , . . . ,Θ
wi
i
)
: the vectors are independent and in any realization θi satisfy∑wi
f=0 θ
f
i = 1, while the variables each have support supp
(
Θfi
)
= {0, 1}, and
expectation E
[
Θfi
]
= afi .
By Lemma 4 of Budish [2011], the expected clearing error is bounded by:
EΘ!...ΘL′
∥∥∥∥∥∥
L′∑
i=1
wi∑
f=0
(
afi − θfi
)
dfi
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
L′∑
i=1
EΘi
∥∥∥∥∥∥
wi∑
f=0
(
afi − θfi
)
dfi
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤ σM
4
We now proceed by induction on the students. For each i, if the conditional
expectation on
(
θˆj
)
j<i
satisfies
EΘi...ΘL′


∥∥∥∥∥∥
L′∑
i=1
wi∑
f=0
(
afi − θfi
)
dfi
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
| θˆ1, . . . , θˆi−1

 ≤ σM
4
then at least one θˆi must also satisfy the above bound. We can find such θˆi
in polynomial time by computing the conditional expectation for every feasible
θˆ
′
i:
EΘi+1...ΘL′


∥∥∥∥∥∥
L′∑
j=1
wj∑
f=0
(
afj − θfj
)
dfj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
| θˆ1, . . . , θˆi

 = i∑
j=1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
wj∑
f=0
(
afj − θˆfj
)
dfj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
+
L′∑
j=i+1
EΘj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
wj∑
f=0
(
afj − θfj
)
dfj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
+
∑
j 6=h≤i
wj∑
f=0
wh∑
g=0
(
afj − θˆfj
)(
agh − θˆgh
)
The chosen
(
θˆi
)L′
i=1
define an allocation x∗ with bounded clearing error. We
now follow step 9 of Budish [2011] in order to define budgets b∗ such that x∗ is
the preferred consumption by all the students at price p∗.
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We define, for every i, b∗i = bi+ τi,x∗i . For i > L
′ we have x∗i = di (p
∗, bi, τi).
By requirement 2 of lemma 4, every bundle that student i prefers over x∗i had
a greater tax and was still unaffordable at p∗; it now costs more than bi+ τi,x∗i .
For i ≤ L′ notice that every bundle x⊥i that i prefers over x∗i and was exactly
affordable at p∗ with taxes τ and budget b, x⊥ must cost strictly more than i’s
new budget b∗i . Therefore, (x
∗,b∗,p∗) is a
(√
σM
2 , β
)
-CEEI
B Additional gadgets for Theorem 2
In this section we prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Let nx ≥ 28 · α and suppose that the economy has courses cx and
cy. Then for any of the functions f listed below, we can add: a course cz, and at
most nx students interested in each of cx and cy, such that in any (α, β)-CEEI
p∗z ∈
[
f
(
p∗x, p
∗
y
)− 2β, f (p∗x, p∗y)+ 2β]
1. HALF: fG/2 (x) = x/2
2. VALUE: fG 1
2
≡ 12
3. SUM: fG+ (x, y) = min (x+ y, 1)
4. DIFF: fG− (x, y) = max (x− y, 0)
5. LESS: fG< (x, y) =
{
1 x > y + β
0 y > x+ β
6. AND: fG∧ (x, y) =
{
1
(
x > 12 + β
) ∧ (y > 12 + β)
0
(
x < 12 − β
) ∨ (y < 12 − β)
7. OR: fG∨ (x, y) =
{
1
(
x > 12 + β
) ∨ (y > 12 + β)
0
(
x < 12 − β
) ∧ (y < 12 − β)
In particular, p∗z ∈
[
f
(
p∗x, p
∗
y
)− 2β, f (p∗x, p∗y)+ 2β] in every (α, β)-CEEI even
if up to nz ≤ nx/28 additional students (beyond the ones specified in the proofs
below) are interested in course cz.
Notice, that like in similar gadget reductions from PPAD-complete problems,
LESS, AND, and OR are brittle comparators (see discussion in Daskalakis et al.
[2009] for more details).
Proof.
1. HALF:
Let cz have capacity qz = nx/8, let nz = qz/2, and consider three
auxiliary courses c1, c2, and cx of capacities q1 = q2 = qz and
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qx = nx/2. Using lemma 1 add nx students that will guarantee px ∈
[1− p∗x, 1− p∗x + β]. Additionally, consider nx = nx/4 students with pref-
erence list: ({cz, c1, cx} , {cz, c2, cx} , {c1, c2, cx}) (in this order), then:
• If the total price p∗i + p∗j of any pair i, j ∈ {1, 2, z} is less than
p∗x−β, then all nx students will be able to afford some subset in their
preference list, leaving a total overbooking of at least z∗z + z
∗
1 + z
∗
2 ≥
2nx − 3qz = nx/8, which violates the (α, β)-CEEI conditions
• If the total price of any of the pairs above (wlog, p∗1 + p∗2) is greater
than p∗x + β, then none of the nx students will be able to afford the
subset {c1, c2, cx}. Therefore the number of students taking cz will
be at least the sum of students taking c1 or c2. Therefore, even after
taking into account nz additional students, we have that z
∗
z+z
∗
1+z
∗
2 ≥
qz − nz = nx/16.
2. VALUE:
Similarly to the HALF gadget, consider two auxiliary courses c1 and c2,
and let nx students have preferences: ({cz, c1} , {cz, c2} , {c1, c2}). Then,
following the argument for the HALF gadget, it is easy to see that p∗z ∈[
1
2 ,
1
2 + β
]
in any (α, β)-CEEI, with nz = nx/8.
3. DIFF:
Let cx be a course with price p
∗
x ∈ [1− p∗x, 1− p∗x + β], qx = nx/2, and
consider nx = nx/4 students willing to take {cx, cy, cz}. Then it is easy
to see that
p∗z ∈
[
1− p∗x − p∗y, 1− p∗x − p∗y + β
]
⊆ [p∗x − p∗y − β, p∗x − p∗y + β]
with nz = nx/16
4. SUM:
Concatenating NOT and DIFF gadgets, we have:
p∗x ∈ [1− p∗x, 1− p∗x + β]
p∗z ∈
[
p∗x − p∗y − β, p∗x − p∗y + β
]
p∗z ∈
[
1− (p∗x − p∗y + β) , 1− (p∗x − p∗y − β)+ β]
⊆ [p∗x + p∗y − 2β, p∗x + p∗y + 2β]
for nz = nx/2
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5. LESS:
Let cx be a course with price p
∗
x ∈ [1− p∗x, 1− p∗x + β], qx = nx/2; let
qz = nx/8 and nz = nx/16. Consider nx/4 students wishing to take
({cx, cy} {cz}), in this order:
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• If p∗y > p∗x + β, then p∗x + p∗y > 1 + β, and therefore none of the nx/4
students will be able to afford the first pair; they will all try to sign
up to cz which will be overbooked unless p
∗
z > 1
• If p∗x > p∗y + β, then all nx/4 students will sign up for the first pair,
forcing p∗z = 0 in any (α, β)-CEEI.
6. AND:
Let c 1
2
be a course with price p∗1
2
∈ [ 12 , 12 + β] and n 12 = nx/8, as guaran-
teed by gadget VALUE; let qz = nx/32 and nz = nx/64. Consider nx/16
students wishing to take
({
cx, c 1
2
}
,
{
cy, c 1
2
}
, {cz}
)
, in this order.
• If (p∗x > 12 + β) ∧ (p∗y > 12 + β), then the nx/16 students can afford
neither pair. They will all try to sign up for cz, forcing p
∗
z > 1, in
any (α, β)-CEEI.
• If (x < 12 − β) ∨ (y < 12 − β), then the nx/16 students can afford at
least one of the pairs and will register for those courses. Thus p∗z = 0.
7. OR:
Similar to the AND gadget; students will want
({
cx, cy, c 1
2
}
, {cz}
)
, in
this order.
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